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PREFACE 
This is a working paper in a continuing project "Mineral 
Scarcity and Economic Change", partially supported at IIASA by 
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. 
The participants are: Professor Harold J. Barnett, IIASA 
and Washington University, St. Louis, U.S.A.; Mr. Gerard M. 
van Muiswinkel, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria; and Professor 
Mordecai Shechter, University of Haifa, Israel. 
In the present paper evidence is given on trends in relative 
cost to obtain minerals, for selected regions and countries. On 
this basis the question of increasing economic scarcity of 
minerals is addressed, and attention is given to the underlying 
forces that affect mineral cost trends. 
The data that are used are from an IIASA data base that 
covers about 50 mineral price series and economic variables on 
45 countries. 
However, in this paper we focus primarily on Western 
European countries for the period 1950-1979. Since the data 
effort finished in summer 1980, the second oil price boom is 
not fully reflected. 
The authors are grateful to Mr. Piotr Findeisen of Warsaw 
University, Poland, for programming and processing the data 
and charts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread belief that minerals become increasingly 
scarce during economic growth. Two elements of the concept are: 
(i) the physical endowments of mineral resources are a fixed 
total, as compared to the increased demands from economic growth; 
and (ii) we tend to use the best economic resources first. Like 
agriculture, minerals are conceived to be a decreasing returns 
or increasing cost industry; formal economic literature for agri- 
culture goes back to Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Mill. In 
addition, the limited minerals resources are subject to deple- 
tion from use, and this is believed further to restrict returns. 
W.S. Jevons was one of the first to write on this, in 1863. A 
well knownHotelling theorem treats minerals as a capital asset 
subject to withdrawals. Most resources writings of the past 
hundred years, ranging from early literature on lebensraum and 
colonialism to the New International Economic Order, affirm the 
theory of increasing economic scarcity of mineralstrelated to 
physical limits. 
A number of writings, however, have questioned its rele- 
vance in the modern world, in concept and in fact. With respect 
to the diminishing returns theory, it is static. It thus omits 
consideration of increases in knowledge, improvements in tech- 
niques of production, transportation and use, discoveries of 
new resources and substitutes, growth in international trade, 
recycling, and other social-technical changes. With respect to 
the facts,a study from Resources for the Future discovered 
contrary evidence- (Barnett & Morse, 1963). In the U.S.A., over 
a period of almost a century to 1957 minerals production was not 
subject to increasing costs, either absolutely or relative to 
non-extractive goods. Charts 1 and 2 summarize the data. In 
U. S. MINERALS: Labor cost per unit of output 
1870-1957. Note: so l id  l ines  connect points i n  
annual series;  dashed l ines  connect points 
w e r  a year apart. 
CHART 2 
Trends i n  unit prices of mineral products relative t o  
non extractive products i n  the U.S. 1870-1957. 
Char t  1 ,  w e  see t h a t  t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  of mine ra l s  i n  terms of 
mandays of l a b o r  t o  produce them has  d e c l i n e d  p e r s i s t e n t l y .  I n  
Char t  2 ,  w e  observe t h a t  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  of u n i t s  of  mine ra l s  i n  
terms of  o t h e r  goods foregone d i d  n o t  i n c r e a s e .  Another r e c e n t  
s tudy  marsha l led  evidence from geology and technology on 
p o t e n t i a l  minera l  s u p p l i e s  and s u b s t i t u t i o n s  t o  c a s t  doubt on 
t h e  concept  of i n e l u c t a b l e ,  p e r v a s i v e ,  i n c r e a s i n g  economic s c a r c i t y  
(Goe l l e r  & Weinberg, 1978) .  However, p u b l i c  o f f i c a l s ,  t h e  p r e s s ,  
and book l i t e r a t u r e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  g e n e r a l  popu la t i on ,  b e l i e v e  
s t r o n g l y  i n  t h e  d o c t r i n e  of i n c r e a s i n g  economic s c a r c i t y  o f  minera l  
r e sou rces ,  by a  very  l a r g e  margin. 
The m a t t e r  i s  very impor tan t :  t h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  s o c i e t i e s  a r e  
making major d e c i s i o n s ,  w i t h  b e l i e f  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  economic s c a r c i t y  
o f  mine ra l s  a s  e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  premises .  Th i s  is  t r u e ,  f o r  
example, i n  energy d e c i s i o n s  o f  n a t i o n s ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
over  ocean r e s o u r c e s ,  and Th i rd  World e f f o r t s  t o  ach i eve  a  New 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Order.  
The f u r t h e r  s imple  f a c t ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i s  t h a t  cohe ren t  
evidence i s  l a c k i n g  concerning t h e  contemporaneous t r e n d  of c o s t s  
of  mine ra l  r e sou rces  i n  c o u n t r i e s  and r eg ions .  To a  degree ,  
s o c i e t i e s  a r e  p r o j e c t i n g  f u t u r e  minera l  c o s t s  w i thou t  adequate  
unders tand ing  of t h e i r  r e c e n t  economic h i s t o r y .  The p r e s e n t  paper  
makes a  s t e p  towards p rov id ing  evidence.  I n  t h i s  pape r ,  we focus  
p r i m a r i l y  on Europe and i t s  c o u n t r i e s .  Our purpose  is  t o  g i v e  
evidence on t r e n d s  i n  economic s c a r c i t y  o f  imported mine ra l s ,  
expressed  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  f o r  r e g i o n s  and c o u n t r i e s  t o  
o b t a i n  them. For d i s c u s s i o n  of  v a r i o u s  economic s c a r c i t y  measures,  
see Smith (1979) and B a r n e t t  & van Muiswinkel (1980) .  
Our b a s i c  measure w i l l  be  t h e  t r e n d s  o f  world market  p r i c e s .  
I n  a l l  c a s e s ,  u n l e s s  o the rwi se  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d ,  t h e  minera l  
p r i c e s  a r e  d e f l a t e d - - t h a t  i s ,  w i l l  be  expressed  r e l a t i v e  t o  over-  
a l l  p r i c e s .  For t h e  European OECD c o u n t r i e s  a s  a  group,  o u r  
u sua l  d e f l a t o r  i s  t h e  p r i c e  o f  GDP i n  OECD Europe (based on 
domest ic  c u r r e n c i e s  conver ted  i n t o  d o l l a r s ) .  When w e  t u r n  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o r r e c t i o n s  f o r  exchange 
r a t e s  w i l l  be made, and ou r  u s u a l  d e f l a t o r ' w i l l - b e  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
wholesale  p r i c e  index  o r  p r i c e  of  GDP. The e f f e c t  w i l l  be t h a t  
t h e  c o r r e c t e d  p r i c e s  w i l l  n o t  on ly  exp re s s  economic s c a r c i t y  
t r e n d s  of  mine ra l s ,  b u t  they  w i l l  a l s o  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  
economic s i t u a t i o n s  of  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s .  
11. OECD - EUROPE 
Overa l l  Minerals  P r i c e  Index 
The UN h a s  c o n s t r u c t e d  an index  of minera l  p r i c e s  o v e r a l l .  
I t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  minera l  f u e l s ,  o r e s ,  and crude f e r t i l i z e r s  which 
a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  involved i n  f o r e i g n  t r ade* .  The index  
* Crude pet roleum,  c o a l ,  n a t u r a l  g a s ,  i r o n  o r e ,  manganese o r e ,  
chrome o r e ,  phosphate rock--weighted accord ing  t o  t r a d e  va lues .  
unad ju s t ed  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  10-fold  from 1950 t o  1979. 
When d e f l a t e d  by t h e  OECD p r i c e  o f  GDP, t h e  r e c o r d  is  a s  f o l l ows :  
O v e r a l l  Minera l  P r i c e ' s  ( d e f l a t e d )  
The annua l  i n c r e a s e s  from 1950 t o  1979 ave rage  abou t  1 . 4%-  
compounded. W e  see, however, t h a t  t h e r e  was a  d e c l i n i n g  t r e n d  
from 1950 t o  1970. Then i n  1974, t h e  m i n e r a l s  p r i c e  i ndex  jumped 
s h a r p l y .  
The ev idence  s u g g e s t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s :  
(i) For t h i s  i ndex  it i s  n o t  u s e f u l  t o  g e n e r a l i z e  abou t  a  
t r e n d  f o r  t h e  whole p e r i o d ,  when t h e  p a t t e r n  h a s  re- 
v e r s e d  and changed s o  g r e a t l y  s i n c e  1970. 
(ii) The i n c r e a s e  s i n c e  1970 does  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a  " t r end" .  
I t  was an  a b r u p t  change i n  1974, r e f l e c t i n g o ' i l p r i c e  
i n c r e a s e s .  
( i i i ) I t  is probab ly  mi s l ead ing  t o  g e n e r a l i z e  abou t  p r i c e s  
o f  m i n e r a l s ,  o v e r a l l .  O i l  dominates t h e  agg rega t e .  I n  
1975, t h e  o i l  s t a t i s t i c a l  we igh t  i n  t h e  i ndex  w a s  855, 
and i n  1970 it was 61%. 
For o u r  purposes  w e  abandon t h e  o v e r a l l  i n d e x  and t u r n  t o  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  m i n e r a l s  and smaller groups .  
F u e l  Mine ra l s  P r i c e s  
The UN f u e l  m i n e r a l s  i ndex  (pe t ro leum,  c o a l ,  and n a t u r a l  
g a s )  i s  weighted by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  v a l u e s ,  and t h u s  i s  a l s o  
dominated by pet ro leum.  I n  1975, pe t ro leum was 90% o f  t h e  i ndex  
w e igh t ,  and even i n  1953 it was 701. Again, it does  n o t  pay t o  
l ook  a t  t h e  agg rega t e - - i t  w i l l  move l i k e  pe t ro l eum,bu t  a  b i t  
s l u g g i s h .  W e  look  a t  pe t ro leum d i r e c t l y ,  t h e n  a t  coal. 
D e f l a t e d  o i l  p r i c e s  d e c l i n e d  from 1950 t o  1970. They t h e n  
i n c r e a s e d  modera te ly  f o r  a few y e a r s ,  as i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  
and OPEC n e g o t i a t e d  h i g h e r  p r i c e s  o r  p r e s s u r e d  o i l  companies f o r  
h i g h e r  r o y a l t i e s .  P r i c e s  t hen  t r e b l e d  i n  1974, when t h e  govern- 
ments of  t h e  p roduc ing  c o u n t r i e s  and OPEC took  f u l l  c o n t r o l  and 
have s i n c e  moved s i d e w i s e .  T h i s  i s  shown i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d a t a :  
Prices 0.f Petroleum (deflate'd) 
Major exporting countries Saudia Arabia 
The first column is a combined price of major oil ex- 
porters and the second is Saudi Arabia alone, each deflated by 
the OECD-Europe price of GDP. See also Chart 3. From these 
data and other knowledge the following conclusions can be formed. 
The first is this: the decline in relative price of 
petroleum 1950 to 1970 represented increasing plenitude of the 
natural resource, oil. Much of the incremental oil supply cost 
as little as 10 cents a barrel to find, develop, and produce. 
Even today such cost in the Middle East is less than $1. a 
barrel, as compared with a sale price of $30. The history of 
price statistics from 1950 to 1970 says that international oil 
supply from Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America-was- 
becoming more plentiful and cheaper. This is why, of course, 
western nations rushed to invest in and develop and use it, in 
preference to their domestic sources and coal. The change in 
natural resource availability and technological conditions of 
supply under competitive conditions was toward increased 
plenitude--i.e. lower cost. 
The second major conclusion has an opposite effect. 
Institutional parameters have changed. The increased economic 
and political cooperation of the major producers led to OPEC 
cartel controls which have been substituted for competition in 
supply. This is why relative prices rose in the 1970s, after 
an earlier period of plenitude. The OPEC claim that its price 
increases since 1974 have kept pace with inflation in indus- 
trialized countries is confirmed by the chart. The world econo- 
mic scarcity of oil in the 1970s is mainly or perhaps exclusively 
due to institutional restrictions and levies on supply by the 
governments in oil producing countries--OPEC members and the non- 
OPEC price followers in all other countries, among them USA, 
USSR, Norway, Mexico, Egypt, etc. A qualification is that the 
industrialized countries as a group have tried to find and develop 
own petroleum resources, but have not been able to cover own needs. 
CHART 3 
OECD - EUROPE 
PRICES OF IMPORTED PETROLEUM (DEFLATED) 
Even if they could it might require higher prices than we have 
today. On a world scale without the current behavior of the main 
suppliers, however, it is likely that the pre-1970 trend would 
be closely followed, assuming ongoing efficiency improvements 
in finding and developing new resources. 
We can draw a third conclusion if we look at the deflated 
prices of other fuels. Just as non-OPEC oil producers happily 
follow the higher prices in the cartel controlled international 
oil market, so also gas, coal, and nuclear suppliers have tried 
to follow oil prices upward in the 1970s. Their ability to 
follow is, of course, subject to their characteristics and 
limitations--natural resources, technology, institutions, and 
changes in these. 
Deflated coal prices in international trade declined or 
were roughly constant from 1950 to near 1970, as demand shifted 
to cheap foreign oils. Later, in the early 1970s and especially 
in 1974, coal rose in price because oil became expensive and 
nuclear fuel supply was restricted. Since 1974, when relative 
oil prices have stabilized, coal prices have declined. The 
statistical record is as follows: 
Coal prices (OECD-Europe GDP-deflator) 
Is coal becoming increasingly scarce? Physically, coal 
reserves are very plentiful--hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
years of potential supply at present levels of use. Institution- 
ally and technically, enlarged coal supplies are subject to 
enormous obstacles. These include safety regulations, pollution 
controls, transportation and manpower shortages, inadequate 
investment funds, and the threat of increased competition and 
capital loss from other energy suppliers. Whether coal supply 
becomes increasingly scarce and prices rise depends'on the 
abilities of governments and industries to reduce these obstacles 
to coal production and use. Coal's present deflated price is 
close to the 1950 level. 
We have only a few data on natural gas and no suitable data 
on nuclear. Natural gas prices tend to follow oil or sometimes 
coal, subject to the costs of gas transportation, the high value 
of imported LNG for peaking, and government regulations. A 
Dutch price series shows a 1979 index level of 130, relative to 
1970. More generally, gas export prices, for example in 
Algerian efforts, have tended toward to btu price of oil. Nuclear 
fuel prices have been cartelized by producing governments and 
regulated by others, at levels much higher than in the 1960s. 
Non-Fuel Minerals 
We now consider major non-fuel minerals. These are the 
metallic minerals and crude fertilizers. (We ignore building 
materials--sand,gravel, cement, etc. These are ubiquitous, 
unlimited resources and are not major in international trade.) 
As before, the essence of the question is whether we can dis- 
cover increasing economic scarcity in evidence of deflated price 
trends. We consider first the following aggregate minerals 
indexes, published by the UN, World Bank and UNCTAD organizations. 
YA (minerals, ores, metals), comprised of iron ore, manganese 
-
ore, phosphate, al~minium~copper, lead, zinc, tin and 
tungsten. 
MM - (metals and minerals), comprised of the YA components plus 
nickel and bauxite (but we have this series only to 1978) 
ANF (non-ferrous base metals), comprised of YA components plus 
nickel but excluding iron ore, manganese ore, tungsten and 
phosphate. 
Has there been an increasing trend of deflated prices for 
non-fuel minerals groups from 1950 to 1979? The answer appears 
to be no. If the statistical data are valid, they are important 
evidence. They contradict wide-spread belief that these minerals, 
like oil, have been becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. 
Has there perhaps been an increasing trend in these deflated 
price series in recent.years, even if not since 1950? The 
answer again appears to be no. The deflated prices of non-fuel 
minerals groups may have even declined slightly in the 1970s. 
The data are as follows; (see also Chart 4): 
Non-Fuel Mineral Prices (OECD-Europe GDP deflator) 
ANF 
-

There was a speculative mineral price boom in 1973-1974, 
but this was reversed by later decline and the more general 
inflationary burst of the 1970s. The boom as such was not ex- 
ceptional, because the same has happened with these non-fuel 
minerals in 1951, 1955, 1966 an3 1969, as the Chart shows. 
Another explanation for the general concern might be that 
prices of many renewab le  raw materials showed a greater tendency 
to rise than the minerals. Deflated U.N. group indexes of prices 
of food and agricultural non-food commodities illustrate this: 
the 1974 values relative to 1970 were 144 and 135 respectively. 
(Like non-fuel minerals, relative prices then fell: 1979 values 
were 97 and 99.) 
Individual Non-Fuel Minerals 
We have more than a dozen individual minerals and metals 
on which to present evidence and must try to simplify. We 
start this way. All of them declined or were approximately 
level in deflated price from 1950 to 1979 (see Table A )  . In 
this respect, they give evidence against increasing economic 
scarcity of minerals. In some cases high peak values were 
reached, but these do not affect the general picture. Zinc 
and phosphate rock, for instance, reacted strongly in 1974, but 
prices declined rapidly during the years following. 
The question which remains, is to detect whether there was 
a change in the trend in the 1970s towards increasing price. 
There are three such possible cases in the Table A data: lead, 
tin, and perhaps bauxite: 
Prices (OECD-Euro~e GDP-deflator 1 
Copper 
Nickel 
Bauxite (Guyana) 
(Jamaica) 
Aluminum 
Lead 
Zinc 
Tin 
Iron ore 
Chrome ore 
Manganese ore 
Manganese 
Mercury 
'Tungsten ore 
Phosphate rock 
Potash 
Table A 
Prices (OECD-Europe GDP deflator) 
Lead 
-
Tin 
-
Bauxite (Guyana) 
It is difficult to view the lead changes from 1970 to 1979 
as a scarcity trend. The annual figures are volatile, 7 of 9 
observations are below 100, and the 1979.terminal figure is an 
abrupt 44% higher than the preceding year. 
The tin figures, on the other hand, indicate a degree of 
scarcity: 5 of the 9 figures following 1970 exceed 100, and the 
drift of the 70s has been upward. Since 1956, the tin market 
has been influenced by the International Tin Council, by means 
of short-term buffer stock operations and export quotas, in an 
effort to influence and stabilize prices. Although ITC quotas 
were in operation during short periods in '73 and 1975-76, it 
is unlikely that this consumer-producer forum (the ITC per se) 
caused the upward trend in the 70s. This does not, however, 
exclude the possibility of institutional supply restrictions 
by individual producers and countries. 
The bauxite trend in the 1970s, although weaker, also 
perhaps indicates scarcity. However, it is purely an insti- 
tutional phenomenon. Bauxite and substitutes are extraordinarily 
plentiful resources. The individual producing.countries have 
negotiated improved terms with the few oligopoly buyers. 
Improvements were overdue, but the methods of change were un- 
fortunate in Jamaica and possibly elsewhere. The International 
Bauxite Association, however, is little effective as a cartel; 
it is unable to control quantities or prices (Barnett, 1979). 
With these two possible exceptions, all the evidence of 
the 15 individual non-fuel minerals and metals series and 3 
group series testify against increasing scarcity: the signifi- 
cant ores, metals, and fertilizers have not had a rising price 
trend relative to the price of all goods and services in the 
OECD-Europe aggregation of nations. 
I11 IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
The foregoing analysis has treated the mineral scarcity 
hypothesis--the supply price conditions for the Western European 
economy as a whole. 
We now consider what these have meant for the individual 
countries. To do this in full degree is beyond our capability. 
It would require that we compare the changes in the prices of 
mineral inputs with changes in the prices of other production 
inputs; then observe shifts in minerals use and factor pro- 
portions induced from changes in prices and technology; and 
then appraise a variety of macro and parameter change effects, 
leading to effects on income and output per capita. 
At this time we can only do the first of these. We compare 
changes in prices of imported minerals with changes in wholesale 
prices (or prices of GDP) in individual countries. Since inter- 
national mineral prices (Pi) are expressed in dollars and whole- 
sale prices (WHP) in domestic currency, we make them comparable 
by employing a foreign exchange conversion factor (FE). This 
is the number of units of domestic currency per dollar, in each 
year. Thus we can compare: (PjxFE) with WHP. Alternatively, 
we can express the relationship as Pi vs. FE/WHP, and we can look 
at the real cost of minerals in terms of domestic wholesale goods 
generally by observing PjxFE/WHP. 
Petroleum 
Almost all countries benefitted from discovery and develop- 
ment of the remarkably cheap oil of Middle East, Africa, and 
other places during the two decades, 1950 to 1970. During the 
world wide, gradual inflation of the period, petroleum prices 
in the consumers' own currency generally increased slower than 
wage rates or wholesale prices. Cheaper petroleum was substi- 
tuted for other fuels and other factors of production with 
attendant increases of productivity of labor, capital, and other 
inputs. 
In the decade of the seventies, the process reversed. Every 
country without exception experienced increase in imported 
petroleum cost, in own currency. The increases far outran in- 
creases in costs of other factors. Efforts have been made to 
substitute labor, capita1,and other inputs for expensive petro- 
leum, with inevitable losses in productivity. 
The strength of the petroleum price movements in both 
periods was large. It was so dominant that the pattern of im- 
pact was common for all nations--significant decline in relative 
price in 1950-1970, enormous increase in 1970-79. 
Yet, eyen so, the variability of effect on consuming nations 
was substantial. Table B arrays the relative impacts of petro- 
leum price changes compared with wholesale price changes from 
1950 to 1979 upon most of the OECD European countries. 
TABLE B. Relative prices of imported petroleum 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
ERG 
Greece 
Ireland 
I t a l y  
Nether lands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
Ratio: P x F E / w  p e t  
(1970-100) 
1950 1970 
In Europe the largest and least relative impacts from the OPEC 
price rise from 1970 to 1979 were as follows: 
Largest - Least 
France 432 Switzerland 323 
I t a l y  43 1 FR Germany 367 
Belgium 420 Denmark 368 
Greece 418 Gus t r i a  3 73 
We learn the following. When the actual mineral price 
change is very large (the petroleum dollar price rose 11-fold), 
the impact is clearly visible in the relative factor prices in 
each of the nations. But the impact is felt differently among 
nations for a variety of reasons. Among them is relative strength 
of own economy as manifest in foreign exchange and domestic prices. 
Another main element in effect of the oil price rise is whether 
the country is an oil producer and thus somewhat shielded, or 
even is a net exporter. 
Non-Fuel Minerals 
In the case of non-fuel minerals, international mineral 
price increases expressed in dollars were far smaller than in 
petroleum. The differences among countries in the multiplicative 
deflator index (FE/WHP) then played a more substantial role in 
the calculations of deflated mineral prices than for petroleum. 
How shall we present the information on relative price 
movements of individual minerals to the individual European 
consuming nations? We start with a figure for Germany (FR). 
It shows the trend of the nominal world market prices of non- 
fuel minerals--then these prices adjusted by the rising value 
of the Deutsche Mark relative to the dollar; and then this price 
further adjusted by the price of GDP in Germany (FR). The 
result is the price of the imported minerals relative to the 
price of all other economic goods in Germany, both expressed in 
DM and converted to index numbers. 
However, with 16 nations and price indexes for more than 
15 non-fuel minerals, the story would become repetitive and 
tedious. We try to avoid this by summarizing and simplifying 
in three ways. First, we remind the reader of the evidence 
presented earlier for the OECD group of nations as a whole: 
in only tin and perhaps bauxite among the non-fuel minerals, 
for only the 1970-79 sub-period, did we find what may be signifi- 
cant increases in relative prices (see pp.11). Second, we shall 
ignore declines or constancies or small increases in relative 
prices which characterize most of the minerals. We shall focus 
only on cases of possibly significant trends of price increase. 
We define these as increases which average 2% or more a year, 
compounded, for relevant periods. (For orientation: an average 
annual rate of 2%, compounded, doubles relative price in 35 years. 
Commodity prices fluctuate widely in short periods, sometimes 
10 to 50% in a year or two.) 
Third, we observe two patterns which typify the impacts 
of international mineral prices upon the price and foreign 
exchange systems of European countries. One group of countries 
is represented in this respect by (say) Austria. The other 
pattern is represented by (say) Belgium. The patterns are de- 
fined by the countries' multiplicative deflators (FE/WHP), which 
are applied to the common dollar international mineral prices. 
Table C presents these countries and information on the trends 
of their multiplicative deflators. 

TABLE C. Average Annual Compound Rates of Decline in FE/WHP 
(percent 1 
Group 1 
Norway 
Ire land 
Spain 
FR Germany 
Austria 
Denmark 
Net he-rland s 
United kingdom 
Switzerland 
Group 2 
F i nland 
Portugal 
Belgium 
I taly 
France 
Greece 
5.5 percent 
5.4 
5.4 
5.4 
5.3 
5 . 3 
5.2 
5.0 
5.0 
10.7 percent 
10.9 
11 .3 
11.8 
11 .6 
11 .7 
11 .2 
10.9 
13.0 
For the first group of countries, we find possibly increasing 
relative price trends for 2 non-fuel mineral commodities. These 
occur in the period 1970 to 1979 only. These commodities are tin 
(relative price rises about 3.5% a year) and lead (about 2.5%). 
This finding identifies as possibly scarce the same minerals as 
earlier for OECD-Europe as a group, where the deflator was the 
price of GDP except for bauxite (about 1.8%). The comments made 
there are applicable here as well--the period is short, only a 
decade; the annual lead changes are erratic; and revealed scarcity 
of tin is probably attributable to institutional influences rather 
than to natural resource limitations or technological conditions. 
For the second group of OECD countries we find (in addition 
to tin and lead) the following candidates for scarcity trends: 
Mineral 
Tin 
Lead 
Bauxite 
Nickel 
Chrome ore 
Tungsten ore 
Phosphates 
France, Italy 
Relative price increase per pear (percent) 
1950-79 1970-79 
To a degree, these scarcity effects--increase in relative 
prices of minerals in this group of countries--represent the 
individual country developments in trade and domestic economic 
affairs. This is why bauxite, nickel, chrome, tungsten, and 
phosphates appear here, and not in the first group of countries 
as well, and why the rates of increase in the prices of tin and 
lead, are higher. 
Second, concerning the additional minerals, there are un- 
answered questions: 
-Nickel and tungsten: what accounts for the change in 
direction of movement only since 1970? It is not con- 
sistent with the idea of a persistent, long-term scarcity 
trend. 
-Phosphates: we have an alternative price series, also 
for Morocco phosphates, which shows decline in relative 
price 1950 to 1979, and increase of only 1 1/2% a year 
in 1970-79. 
-Chrome: the increasing price in each period and its 
acceleration in 1970-79 tend to support the increasing 
scarcity hypothesis, in mild degree. 
Finally, we conclude as follows, concerning non-fuel 
minerals. There is very little support for Malthusian, Ricardian, 
or Hotelling hypotheses of increasing mineral scarcity. Most of 
the individual minerals and also the non-fuel minerals group 
indexes have declined or been constant in relative price.The few 
instances of evidence of scarcity in supply can be more readily 
related to the institutional phenomena of governmental inter- 
ventions than to natural resource deposits or technological 
conditions. In addition, in a number of Western European 
economies, several international minerals are costing more in 
terms of foreign exchange and domestic goods. This is an in- 
crease in unit value of imported mineral because of deflator 
change. It is due to decline in the international value of 
domestic goods, and is not related to technology, costs or 
institutional conditions of foreign mineral supply. 
IV PRICE IMPACTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
It is apparent that changes in international mineral supply 
prices have varied impacts upon the price and cost systems of 
the consuming countries. We just analyzed and discussed this 
with respect to Western European countries. We now want to 
observe the differential impact of changes in international oil 
and coal prices in the 1970s upon developing countries. We 
want to compare them with changes in prices of other factors. 
As before, we do this by examining deflated mineral prices, 
PixFE/WHP. For orientation, we also show the impacts on Austria 
and Belgium. The data appear in Table D. 
TABLE D. ~ e f l a t e d  P r i c e s  of  O i l  and Coal  (PixF~/WHP) i n  1979 
Petroleum 
938 
Coal 
Pakistan 
India 
Zambia 
Brazil 
Thailand 
Korea 
Yalaysia (GDP deflator) 
Colombia 
Phillipines 
Argentina 
. . . .  
Austria 
Belgium 
We l e a r n  t h e  fo l l owing .  - I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  impact  o f  t h e  
pe t ro leum p r i c e .  rises of t h e  1970s was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  i n  
a  sample of  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  t h a n  i n  developed Western European 
n a t i o n s .  The c o s t  o f  energy  r e l a t i v e  t o  domes t i c  goods and f o r e i g n  
exchange went  up more s h a r p l y  i n  L D C ' s .  The p r i c e  p r e s s u r e  t o  
s u b s t i t u t e  away from t h e  impor ted  energy commodities and t h e  t en -  
dency f o r  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t o  f a l l  was s t r o n g e r .  One unhappy 
c h o i c e  w a s  t o  reduce  even more g r e a t l y  energy  i n p u t s  i n  pro-  
d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e r e b y  r educ ing  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  l a b o r  and 
o t h e r  f a c t o r s  and growth of  GNP. The o t h e r  was t o  m a i n t a i n  such  
energy  use  and pay f o r  it by e x p o r t i n g  more a t  lower p r i c e s ,  t he r eby  
r e d u c i n g  growth o f  r e a l  GDP,  o r  by borrowing more f o r e i g n  exchange. 
Beyond t h e s e  a d v e r s i t i e s  w e r e  d i s l o c a t i o n s  and d i s r u p t i o n s .  
Even i n  advanced economies l i k e  t h e  U.S .  and Europe, w i t h  developed,  
more e f f i c i e n t  market  and p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e  economic 
l o s s e s  merely  from a d j u s t i n g  t o  t h e  s h a r p  p r i c e  changes w e r e  l a r g e .  
Developing c o u n t r i e s  a r e  f a r  less r o b u s t  i n  economic e f f i c i e n c y  
mechanisms. Energy supply catastrophes in these countries have 
been averted only by extreme extensions of credit from the 
developed countries. These are unlikely to be repaid or properly 
serviced, and risk wide-spread financial catastrophes. 
The evidence here, which includes domestic price trends, 
supports the observation that developing countries which do not 
export oil have experienced greater balance of payments problems 
from OPEC prices than developed nations. 
V SUMMARY AND QUALIFICATIONS 
Since World War 11, natural resource and technological change 
conditions for all minerals have tended to result in improved 
supply, and thus declining or constant prices, relative to the 
overall price level in OECD-Burope. However, in the last decade 
the development of institutional innovations has restricted the 
supply of oil. The powerful OPEC cartel has engendered scarcity 
and substantially increased prices of petroleum. This has tended 
to increase prices of other fuel minerals. Also, in this decade, 
but in lesser degree, governments have fostered stabilization 
or moderate increases in tin and bauxite prices. Thus, in the 
decade of the 1970s, OECD-Europe has experienced increasing 
economic scarcity of fuels and of two other minerals of the group 
considered. 
The scarcities have institutional causes. European industri- 
alized countries depend substantially on minerals supply from 
developing countries, and have invested and produced in them under 
favourable conditions in the past. This situation, however, has 
been changing in recent years. Developing countries have been 
increasing control over the exploitation and exports of their 
natural resources. In some cases this results in higher prices 
and thereby increased economic scarcity of the minerals. 
The impacts of mineral price changes on individual countries 
differ substantially. Different trends in exchange rates and 
domestic price levels caused relative prices of some imported 
minerals to indicate increasing economic scarcity in certain 
countries, where increasing plenitude was registered in other 
countries. Especially the developing countries are confronted 
with severe impacts from rising energy prices. 
These findings rest upon the validity of the price indexes 
of the commodities and of the OECD-Europe price indexes. ' 
The sources are respectable--UN, World Bank, OECD, London Metal 
Exchange, etc. In addition we have compiled data on more than 
one index for most of the individual commodities and groups, 
and they give roughly the same results as those we reported, 
above. It is also useful to observe that the statistical trend 
results are similar in both group and individual commodity data. 
But we are at an early stage of a long-term study, and it would 
be desirable to identify still other worthy indexes and see 
whether these give the same results. 
E x p l i c i t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  should a l s o  be given t o  s e v e r a l  major 
i n f luences  on minera l s  p r i c e s  and d e f l a t o r s  i n  t h e  1970s. In- 
c r e a s e s  i n  o i l  p r i c e s  have d i r e c t l y  pushed up c o s t s  and p r i c e s  
of mine ra l s ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and o t h e r  goods g e n e r a l l y .  Also,  
i nc reased  governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n s  on s o c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
environmental  p o l l u t i o n ,  s a f e t y ,  and energy conse rva t ion  have 
reduced p r o d u c t i v i t y  advances and inc reased  p r i c e s .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, reduced economic growth r a t e s  have tended t o  depress  
demand f o r  and p r i c e s  of minera l s  i n  t h e  world economy. These 
s e v e r a l  i n f l u e n c e s  have obviously  i n f luenced  bo th  numerators 
and denominators of  our measures of r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s .  
APPENDIX NOTES 
Appendix A: P r i c e s  of Imported Petroleum r e l a t i v e  t o  p r i c e s  of 
l abour .  
A s t r o n g  form of t h e  c l a s s i c a l  concept  of i n c r e a s i n g  n a t u r a l  
r e sou rces  s c a r c i t y  i S  t h a t  t h e i r  p r i c e s  w i l l  r ise r e l a t i v e  t o  
p r i c e s  (wage rate)  of  labour  du r ing  economic growth. Contemporary 
economic growth theo ry  h o l d s ,  c o n t r a r i w i s e ,  t h a t  l abour  i s  t h e  
f a c t o r  which becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y  s c a r c e  and because of  produc- 
t i v i t y  advance, i t s  p r i c e  w i l l  rise r e l a t i v e  t o  n a t u r a l  resources .  
I t  i s  u s e f u l  t o  look a t  t h e  evidence on r e l a t i v e  s c a r c i t y  of l abour  
and petroleum dur ing  t h e  1970s, fo l lowing  OPEC's en t r ance  i n t o  
c o n t r o l  of o i l  markets.  W e  look a t  t h e  r a t i o s  of  imported 
petroleum p r i c e s  p e r  b a r r e l  t o  t h e  wage r a t e s  i n  t h e  consuming 
c o u n t r i e s ,  a d j u s t e d  f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange r a t ios :  P  pet~FE/WR. 
Table E shows t h a t  imported petroleum has  become very  s c a r c e  
r e l a t i v e  t o  l a b o r  i n  European c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  1970. I n  1979, 
i n c r e a s e  i n  petroleum p r i c e  w a s  about  2 .3  t o  4 . 2  t i m e s  t h e  in-  
c r e a s e  i n  wage r a t e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  OECD-Europe. 
W e  may sugges t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e s e  l a r g e  r e l a t i v e  
p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  of  petroleum. I n  t h e s e  western  market economies, 
f a c t o r  p ropor t ions  and r e l a t i v e  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s  of  f a c t o r s  
t end  t o  be a d j u s t e d  t o  t h e  r a t i o s  of  t h e i r  p r i c e s .  Such l a r g e  
p r i c e  r a t i o  changes of o i l  r e l a t i v e  t o  l a b o r  would c a l l  f o r  
s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t s  t o  change f a c t o r  p ropor t ions .  So doing would 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
would s l o w  p r o d u c t i v i t y  advances o f  l abo r .  I n  f a c t ,  advances of  
l abo r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  have slowed g r e a t l y  i n  t h e  1970s, and some 
p a r t  of  t h i s  i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  g r e a t  rise i n  petroleum p r i c e s .  
TABLE E. ~ e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  of imported petroleum 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
F RG 
Greece 
Ireland 
I t a l y  
Nether lands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
* PpET x FE/Wage Rate 
P ~ E  x FE/Wage Rate i n  1979 
Largest 
Sweden 419 
UK 340 
Finland 302 
Norway 29 1 
Belgium 
Austria 
Switzerland 
France 
Least 
* Wage rates refer  in  most cases t o  hourly earnings. 
Appendix B: Sources of data 
a) Commodity price indexes 
Description 
- Minerals overall: Fuels (94$, Petr.,~oal, 
Gas), Iron ore (3.5461, Manganese ore (0.3%), 
Chrome ore (0.2%) , Crude Fertilizers (1.5%) 
Source 
- Petroleum, major exporters: Saudi ~rabia UN 
f.0.b. Ras-Taruna (37%), Iran f.0.b. 
Kharg Island (19%), Iraq f.0.b. Khar a1 Amaya 
(10$), and others 
- Petroleum Saudi Arabia: Ras Taruna IFS 
- Coal: U.S.A. coking coal c.i.f. North Sea UN 
(66%), Germany FR, hard coal ex-mine (34%) 
- Minerals, ores, metals (YA) : Phosphate UNCTAD 
rock ( 1 1  9 6 )  , Manganese ore (2%) , Iron ore 
(21%)~ luminium (13%) Copper (33%) 
Lead (256), Zinc (4%), Tin (12%)t Tungsten 
(1 $1 
- Metals and Minerals ) : Copper (LME) t 
Tin (LME), Nickel (Can), Aluminum (NY) , 
Lead (LME) , Zinc (LME) , Iron ore (~raz. ) , 
Bauxite (U.S. Jam. ) , Manganese ore (~ndia) ; 
weighted by 1974-76 developing countries 
export values 
- ferrous base metals (ANF) : Copper (4496) 1 UN 
Nickel (10%)~ Aluminium (28%), Lead (4x1, 
Zinc (8%), Tin (7%) 
- Copper: U.S.A. f.0.b. atlantic (9%), LME wirebar UN 
(91%) 
- Nickel: Canada producer price f.0.b. UN 
- Bauxite: U.S. Imports Jamaica 
U.S. Imports Guyana 
- Aluminium U.S.A. producer (18%) 
Canada del. U.K. (82%) 
- Lead: U.K. LME (86%) 
Canada (14%) 
WB 
IFS 
- zinc: U.K. LME (73%) I Canada (27%) UN 
- Tin: Malaysia, ex works Penang (73%) 
U.K. LME (27%) 
- ~ r o n  o r e :  B r a z i l  ( 4 5 % ) ,  Canada (25%)  
Sweden ( 1 8 % ) ,  L i b e r i a  (11%)  
- Chrome o r e :  Turkey,  c i . f .  e u r o p o r t s  UN 
- Manganese o r e :  I n d i a ,  c i . f .  e u r o p o r t s  UN 
- Manganese: I n d i a ,  U.S. p o r t s  IFS 
- Mercury: Spa in  EMJ 
- Tungsten:  c . i . f .  Europe UNCTAD 
- Phosphate  rock  : f . a .  s. ~ a s a b ' l a n c a  UN 
- Potash :  Canada IFS 
The p r i c e s  on p r i c e  i n d e x e s  are from f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  s o u r c e s .  
A l l  series have been t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  i n d e x e s  w i t h  1970=100 
and a r e  based  on U.S. d o l l a r  p r i c e s .  They c a n  b e  found i n :  
- "Methods used  i n  compi l ing  t h e  U.N. i n d e x e s  f o r  b a s i c  
commodities i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e " ,  U.N.  S t a t i s t i c a l  
P a p e r s ,  S e r i e s  M,No.29, Rev.2 o f  1979. These series have 
been updated  w i t h  t h e  "U.N.  Monthly B u l l e t i n  o f  S t a t i s t i c s "  
o f  J u l y  1980. Weighting p a t t e r n s  are a d j u s t e d  e v e r y  f i v e  
y e a r s  ( la tes t  1975) and are based  on t r a d e  p a t t e r n s .  
- " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s "  o f  t h e  IMF, Yearbook 
1979 and August 1980 i s s u e  
- "Commodity P r i c e  F o r e c a s t s " ,  World Bank, May 1979. 
- "Monthly Commodity P r i c e  B u l l e t i n " ,  S p e c i a l  Supplement and 
Handbook, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
- "Engineer ing  and Mining J o u r n a l " ,  March 1980. 
b )  Exchange r a t e s  
Used w e r e  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s "  ( IMF)  q u o t a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  p e r i o d  a v e r a g e s  ( y e a r l y )  o f  p a r  r a t e / m a r k e t  rates ( l i n e  
r f ) .  For  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  e x p r e s s  d o l l a r s  i n  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  
r e c i p r o c a l s  were t a k e n .  A l l  exchange rates w e r e  c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  
i n d e x  numbers w i t h  1970=100. 
c) Wage r a t e s  
Sources  are t h e  ILO Yearbooks 1975 and 1979, and t h e  most r e c e n t  
ILO Q u a r t e r l y  ~ u l l e t i n s  and Supplements .  The wages a r e  f o r  
manufac tu r ing  ( a l l  i n d u s t r i e s ) ,  e i t h e r  e x p r e s s e d  a s  e a r n i n g s  o r  
rates p e r  month, week, hour  o r  day.  The d a t a  a r e  a n n u a l  a v e r a g e s  
e x c e p t  f o r  sbme o f  t h e  1979 v a l u e s ,  where t h e  l a tes t  monthly d a t a  
w e r e  t aken .  A l l  wage r a t e s  w e r e  c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  i n d e x e s  w i t h  
1970=100. 
Wholesale Price Indexes 
Sources are IFS volumes, country pages, line 63. They differ 
in coverage which might complicate country comparisons. The 
series have been re-based on 1970=100. 
Implicit GDP-deflators 
These deflators are from the UN Yearbook of National Account 
Statistics 1977, table 8A. For the years 1976-1979 the deflators 
are based on IF'S series, by dividing GDP (line 99b) by GDP in 
1975 prices (line 99 bp). These series were rebased to 1970=100 
and linked to the U.N. data. The OECD-Europe GDP deflator was 
computed from OECD "Main Economic Indicatorsn. 
Growth rates 
The growth rates are compoundinterest rates, or the i from 
XX=X (Ifi)", where Xn and Xo are the latest and first value 
for tie period ) . . .n. 
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